Corporations -- Directors and Officers -- Standard of Care -- Liability for Negligence by Wray, Albert Victor
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 45 | Number 3 Article 19
4-1-1967
Corporations -- Directors and Officers -- Standard
of Care -- Liability for Negligence
Albert Victor Wray
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Albert V. Wray, Corporations -- Directors and Officers -- Standard of Care -- Liability for Negligence, 45 N.C. L. Rev. 748 (1967).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol45/iss3/19
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Corporations-Directors and Officers-Standard of Care-Liability
for Negligence
In Selheimer v. Manganese Corp.,' the majority and managing
directors of Manganese were sued in a derivative action for negli-
gent, imprudent and careless conduct in the management of the
corporation that resulted in loss and ultimate insolvency. The cor-
poration purchased a manganese oxide plant in Paterson, New
Jersey from a corporation owned by the majority directors of
Manganese. Following this purchase, the defendants caused 200,000
shares of stock to be sold to the public, the side netting 412,000 dol-
lars for the corporation. The prospectus for this sale stated that the
corporation proposed to erect and operate a plant in Pennsylvania
where substantial operating activities would be centered and that the
corporation had arranged for the purchase of an ideally located
plant at Colwyn, Pennsylvania, that would enable the corporation
to operate at advantageous freight rates.
In spite of the defendants' knowledge that the Colwyn plant was
far superior to the Paterson plant and that the Paterson plant was
wholly unsuited for commercial production, they continued to invest
money in the Paterson plant. 158,000 dollars was spent on equip-
ment for the plant and, by August 1959, the plant had sustained a
loss of 104,000 dollars with total sales of only 2,000 dollars. By
August, Manganese's funds had been reduced to only 55,000 dollars
out of 412,000 dollars originally available; this amount was not
enough to put the Colwyn plant into operation. The Colwyn plant
was never used. The assets of Manganese brought only 30,000
dollars upon its going into bankruptcy.2
The chancellor found that the managing directors were careless,
imprudent, negligent and wasteful in their conduct, that this conduct
caused the losses and insolvency, and that they were liable personally
for these losses. The reviewing court, sitting en banc, agreed with
the chancellor's finding of negligence, but found that defendants were
not liable unless they were guilty of fraud, self-dealing or wanton
misconduct and dismissed the complaint. The supreme court rejected
1224 A.2d 634 (Pa. 1966).
'There were other transactions involved in the case but they tended to
show some self-dealing by the defendants. These acts are not related to the
issue of negligence but rather to the defendants' lack of good faith.
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the decree of the court en banc3 and held that the defendants' actions
were to be measured by Section 408 of the Business Corporation
Law of 1933 which provides:
Officers and directors shall be deemed to stand in a fiduciary
relation to the corporation, and shall discharge the duties of their
respective positions in good faith and with that diligence, care
and skill which ordinarily prudent men exercise under similar
circumstances in their personal business affairs. (Emphasis
added.)
Under this statute the court affirmed the chancellor's finding of
negligence, but reversed and remanded as to the measure of damages.
The Pennsylvania director's statute, if literally construed, creates a
standard of care which is more stringent than that required at
common law or by similar statutes in other states.
The early cases which attempted to define the relation of the
director to his corporation and the standard of care required of
him in performing his duties vary greatly from state to state.4 The
relation of the director to the corporation has been characterized as
that of agent,5 trustee (or quasi trustee)," and gratuitous manda-
tory.7 Courts in the nineteenth century experienced difficulty in
determining what this relation was and generally avoided thorough
analysis by trying to characterize the relation in terms of well estab-
'The supreme court said that the court en banc misconstrued Smith v.
Brown-Borhek Co., 414 Pa. 325, 200 A.2d 398 (1964) which held that
stockholders can ratify negligent acts of directors but not fraudulent or
wasteful acts.4See Annot., 2 A.L.R. 867 (1919) which discusses representative cases
and the various positions taken by American courts. See generally BALLAX-
Tm, CoRoRATIo s §§ 62-72 (Rev. ed. 1946) [hereinafter cited as BALLA.N-
TINE]; HoRNSTEIN, CORpoRATION LAW AND PRACT'cE, §§ 432-46 (1959)
[hereinafter cited as Homs=IN].
'See, e.g., Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132 (1890); Hun v. Cary,
82 N.Y. 65 (1880). See generally Note, 36 Nom DAmn, LAW. 343 (1961) ;
Bennett, The Louisiana Business Corporation Act of 1928, 2 LA. L. REv.
597 (1940) [hereinafter cited as Bennett].
See, e.g., Hun v. Cary, 82 N.Y. 65 (1880) (trustees to bank depositors);
Besseliew v. Brown, 177 N.C. 65, 97 S.E. 743, 2 A.L.R. (1919). See gen-
erally Bennett 638; Note, 36 No=n DAmE LAW. 343 (1961).
'See, e.g., Swentzel v. Penn Bank, 147 Pa. 140, 23 At. 405 (1892);
Sperling's Appeal, 71 Pa. 11 (1872). In Sperling's Appeal the court said
that directors are not technical trustees. "They can only be regarded as
mandatories-persons who have gratuitously undertaken to perform certain
duties, and who are therefore bound to apply ordinary skill and diligence,
but no more." Id. at 20-21. See generally Adkins & Janis, Some Observa-
tions on Liabilities of Corporate Directors, 20 Bus. LAW. 817, 819 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as Adins]; Bennett 638.
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lished legal categories. The label "agent" is inappropriate since in
reality there is no principal who can control the agent. Trustee is
equally inappropriate since the corporation and not the directors
have title to the assets.' The gratuitous mandatory label is archaic
since it assumes that all directors serve gratuitously and devote little
time to the corporation, an assumption no longer true in many
cases.' However, all courts recognized that a director is a fiduciary
of some sort with the duty to act in good faith and for the benefit
of the shareholders rather than himself. The more modem position
is simply that a director stands in a fiduciary relation to his cor-
poration"0 and that this position is sui generis."
Judicial attempts to define the standard of care required of di-
rectors and the liability for negligent mismanagement resulted in
several distinct positions. The least-stringent is that a director is
only liable for fraud or gross negligence amounting to fraud. This
view is another way of saying that a director must use only slight
care and reveals the reluctance of some courts to review the conduct
S Note, 36 NOTE DAME LAw. 343 (1961).
See, e.g., Sperling's Appeal, 71 Pa. 11 (1872) (Action for negligent
mismanagement) (Directors, not being compensated, not held to strict
standards of trustee or agent of an estate). For the assertion that "manda-
tory" is no longer an appropriate label, see Adkins 819.
" This is evidenced by the wording of several modern directors statutes.
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-142 (1947); LA. REV. STAT. § 12-36 (1951);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-35 (1965); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1.34 (1953);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-408 (1958); WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. §
23.01.360 (1961). In North Carolina, the fiduciary duty runs to the stock-
holders as well as the corporation. For a discussion of the effect of this, see
Folk, Revisiting the North Carolina Corporation Law: The Robinson
Treatise Reviewed and the Statute Reconsidered, 43 N.C.L. REv. 768, 796-
97 (1965). These statutes are similar or identical to the MODEL BUSINESs
CORPORATION AcT § 33, U.L.A. c. 9. However, only a few states adopted
this model act; it was withdrawn by the commissioners in 1957. This act
should not be confused with the American Bar Association's Model Business
Corporation Act which does not contain a similar provision. It has been
used as a model by several states. For a general discussion of the state
statutes, see Adkins 817.
"In re E. C. Warner Co., 232 Minn. 207, 45 N.W.2d 388 (1950), 35
MINN. L. REv. 564 (1951). The court, in a proceeding to determine whether
directors are entitled to reimbursement for defense of suits against the
corporation stated: "Confusion has resulted from a failure to recognize that
the position of a director of a corporation, though fiduciary in many re-
spects, is sui generis and is not to be confused with the position of that of
trustee, quasi-trustee, or agent." Id. at 212, 45 N.W.2d at 392. The court
further stated that the law of agency and trusts was developed before cor-
porations became of great social importance. It is not possible to fit cor-
porate management into either status and do justice to the necessities of it.
Id. at 212, 45 N.W.2d at 392.
[Vol. 45
NEGLIGENT MANAGEMENT
and judgment of directors.'" At the other extreme is the view
adopted in the Pennsylvania statute that a director must use the
same degree of care and prudence that men prompted by self-interest
generally exercise in their own affairs. 3 This standard of care
is generally considered too strict since it would discourage honest
men from serving as directors. 4 The middle and most widely
accepted view is that a director must use the same care, skill, dili-
gence and judgment that an ordinarily prudent man would exercise
in similar circumstances in like position.' 5 This standard is gen-
erally considered the most reasonable and workable one since it is
flexible enough to be applied to varying circumstances and is strict
enough to insure sound management.
Since the late 1920's, eleven states have adopted statutes defining
the relation of the director to the corporation and the standard of
care required of the director.'6 These statutes are generally very
similar to the MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT § 33, 9 U.L.A.
which provides:
"
2 See, e.g., Sperling's Appeal, 71 Pa. 11 (1872); Commonwealth v.
Anchor Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 20 Pa. Super. 101 (1902). The court in Sper-
ling's Appeal, held that directors are liable for fraud, gross negligence, and
gross inattention to duties which results in the fraud of agents, "yet they
are not liable for mistakes of judgment, even though they may be so gross
as to appear as absurd and ridiculous, provided they are honest and provided
they are fairly within the scope of the powers and discretion confided to the
managing body." 71 Pa. at 24. This case has been criticized as being too
lax. See Hun v. Cary, 82 N.Y. 65 (1880); BALLANTiNE § 63. See gen-
erally HORNSTEIN § 446; ANNOT., 2 A.L.R. 867 (1919); Adkins 818-19;
Baynes, The Fiduciary Duty of Management-Concept of the Courts, 35
U. D-r. L.J. 561 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Baynes].
" See, e.g., Hun v. Cary, 82 N.Y. 65 (1880) (Bank directors held liable
for purchase of expensive building to create illusion of prosperity to com-
munity). The court said, "as he is bound to exercise ordinary skill andjudgment, he cannot set up that he did not possess them." Id. at 74. To the
same effect as Hun, see Kavanaugh v. Commonwealth Trust Co., 223
N.Y. 103 (1918) (Action for negligent inattention; defendent never at-
tended meetings).
"' Swentzel v. Penn Bank, 147 Pa. 140, 23 Atl. 405 (1892); BALLANTINE
§ 63; Adkins 818-19. See generally ANNOT., 2 A.L.R. 867 (1919).
"See, e.g., Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132 (1891); Barnes v. An-
drews, 298 Fed. 614 (S.D. N.Y. 1924); Besseliew v. Brown, 177 N.C. 65,
97 S.E. 743, 2 A.L.R. 867 (1919); Hunt v. Aufderheide, 330 Pa. 362, 199
AtI. 345 (1938). See generally BALLANTINE, § 63; Adkins 817; Baynes
561.
" 17 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-142 (1947); Ky. REv. STAT. § 271.365
(1955); LA. REv. STAT. § 12-36 (1951); Mic. STAT. ANN. § 21.47 (1959);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 301.31 (1947); N.Y. Business Corporation Law §
717; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-35 (1965); OxLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1.34
(1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-408 (1958); S.C. CODE ANN. tit. 12,
§ 12-18.13 (Supp. 1966); WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 23.01.360 (1961).
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Officers and directors shall be deemed to stand in a fiduciary
relation to the corporation, and shall discharge the duties of their
respective positions in good faith, and with that diligence, care
and skill which ordinarily prudent men would exercise under
similar circumstances in like positions.
According to the commissioner's note to the model act, the standard
provided in the act is designed to clear up the conflict among the
cases, is believed to represent the weight of authority and is the
most fair and practical standard.' The state statutes, as a rule, do
not change the common law standard but merely codify the generally
accepted rule.' 8 Pennsylvania, alone, creates a different standard of
care by placing the words "in their personal business affairs" in
the place of the words "in like positions" in the model act. 0 This
change of wording is interpreted in Selheimer as changing the
common law standard that existed in Pennsylvania before adoption
of Section 408.
The court in Selheimer, after rejecting the decision of the court
en banc to the effect that directors are only liable for losses result-
ing from fraud, self-dealing or wanton misconduct, 20 stated:
This statute mandates a standard of care for directors much
more stringent and harsh than the standard enunciated by our
courts prior to the passage of the statute. Our case law prior to
the statute taught that the directors of a corporation-whether
business, banking or otherwise-were held simply to a standard
of ordinary care and diligence and that, absent fraud or gross
negligence amounting to fraud, such directors would not be per-
sonally liable for their actions. The standard prior to Section
" MODEL BusixNss Co~uoRATIoN AcT § 33, at 186.
'" See, e.g., Detroit Gray Iron & Steel Foundaries, Inc. v. Martin, 362
Mich. 205, 106 N.W.2d 793 (1961); Fulton v. Talbert, 255 N.C. 183, 120
S.E.2d 410 (1961). For examples of applications and constructions of these
statutes, see Otis & Co. v. Pennsylvania Ry., 61 F. Supp. 905 (E.D. Pa.
1945) (Applies PA. BusINEss CoR0oRATioN AcT § 408); McLeod v.
Lewis-Clark Hotel Co., 66 Idaho 584, 164 P.2d 195 (1945); Pool v. Pool,
16 So. 2d 132 (La. Ct. App. 1943); Detroit Gray Iron & Steel Foundaries,
Inc. v. Martin, 363 Mich. 205, 106 N.W.2d 793 (1961); Scott v. Stanton
Heights Corp., 388 Pa. 628, 131 A.2d 133 (1957). For a general discussion
of these statutes, see Adkins 817; Bennett 637; Note, 36 NoRn DAME LAW.
343 (1961).
0 The statutes in Louisiana, Kentucky, Idaho, North Carolina, Oklahoma,
and Washington adopt substantially the wording of the model act. The
New York, South Carolina, Michigan and Minnesota statutes employ the
model act standard of care but do not state that directors are "deemed to
stand in a fiduciary relation." Minnesota, South Carolina and New York
merely require the directors to discharge their duties in good faith.
"0 See note 4 supra.
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408 might well be stated as that care, skill and diligence which
the ordinary prudent man would exercise under similar cir-
cumstances.2 '
In construing Section 408, the court greatly emphasized the legis-
lative background.2 2 However, after laying this background, the
court, on the facts did not reach a result different from that required
by the common law rule. The court stated: "In our view, however,
regardless of whether we follow the statutory rule or the rule
enunciated in our case law prior to the statute, the same result fol-
lows in the case at bar."23 An affirmative answer to the following
question was said to be self-evident:
In the absence of fraud, self-dealing, or proof of personal
profit or wanton acts of omission or commission, are the directors
of a business corporation, who have been imprudent, wasteful,
careless and negligent, personally liable, under either the common
law or Section 408, where such actions have resulted in corporate
losses resulting in the insolvency of the corporation?2
After reviewing the facts, it was concluded that the defendants'
actions in respect to the Colwyn plant were not the result of errors
of judgment or calculated business risks.2 5 Nor could their actions
be classified as mere negligence. "With the knowledge the defend-
ants had of the unsuitability of the Paterson plant for profitable
21 Selheimer v. Manganese Corp., 224 A.2d 634, 641 (Pa. 1966). At
this point the court reviewed the leading Pennsylvania cases which de-
veloped the common law standard of care, e.g., Hunt v. Aufderheide, 330
Pa. 362, 199 Ati. 345 (1938) (Directors held to same care, skill and dili-
gence ordinarily prudent man would use in similar circumstances) ; Swentzel
v. Penn Bank, 147 Pa. 140, 23 Atl. 405 (1892) (Liable only for fraud or
gross negligence amounting to fraud) (Expressly rejects the "own affairs"
standard); Sperling's Appeal, 71 Pa. 11 (1872) (Liable only for gross
negligence or gross misconduct).
22224 A.2d at 642-43. The court said that a certain legislative back-
ground must be kept in mind: (1) the phrase "in their personal affairs"
was not found in the Model Business Corporation Act, (2) prior to the
statute, the case law rejected the standard expressly provided in Section
408, (3) the standard in Section 408 does not represent the majority view,
(4)_ Section 408 imposes on a director of a business corporation a much
higher degree of care than the law imposes on a director of a banking or
building and loan corporation.
23id. at 643.2 Id. at 644.25Id. at 646. Previously the court stated the generally accepted rule that
directors who exercise their judgment in good faith are not liable for
errors of judgment or mistakes. Id. at 644. This is usually referred to as
the business judgment rule; it takes into account that directors of business
corporations are expected to take calculated business risks. See generally
BALLANTINE §§ 62-72; HORNSTEIN §§ 432-446.
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production," their pouring of assets into the Paterson plant was
held to defy explanation.2" In fact the defendants' whole pattern of
conduct was said to border on willful misconduct and self-dealing
since they caused the corporation to pay them unauthorized salaries
and to purchase equipment from companies in which the defendants
owned an interest." Finally, the court agreed with the chancellor
that the four majority directors were personally liable for any losses
that resulted from their wasteful and negligent actions.28
This case, although clearly establishing that Section 408 differs
from and is more stringent than the common law standard of care,
does little or nothing to illustrate what the difference is. By holding
that the defendants' action was violative of the common law standard
(which was none too clear in Pennsylvania) as well as the statutory
standard, the court avoided the problem of determining exactly the
effect of the words "in their personal business affairs." Admittedly,
it would have been of little value for the court to attempt to draw
an exact line marking the difference between actionable and blame-
less conduct, yet, it would have been helpful if the court had given
some indication of what the effect of the statute is. As the case
stands, it is authority only for the general principle that Section 408
requires greater care than other similar statutes and the common
law standard.
As the court recognized, the terminology of the statute is very
strict20 and if literally applied might render directorships unattrac-
tive.80 A flexible, comparative standard is needed today because
circumstances under which directors act will vary greatly from one
corporation to another-some directors taking a very active role
in management as in Selheimer, and some functioning, for the most
part, in a broad policy making and advisory capacity characteristic
of larger corporations. Negligence is always a question of fact
under the circumstances. The court in Selheimer recognizes this
statement as a guiding general principle ;31 however, under the
224 A.2d at 646.These facts relate to the issue of breach of the duty to act in good faith
and not to the issue of failure to use due care. At the suggestion of de-
fendant Selheimer, the board of directors voted to reimburse the corpora-
tions for salaries received but they had not been repaid. Id. at 638-39. For
cases involving breach of fiduciary duty under Section 408, see id. at 643.
21 Id. at 646.
20 Id. at 640, 643.
0 See BALLANTINE § 63; Adkins 819.
31224 A.2d at 644.
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Pennsylvania statute, the court, of necessity, will have less latitude
in taking the circumstances of each case into account than will
other courts that apply the majority rule. Regardless of the size of
the corporation, the nature of it, the number of directorships a par-
ticular director holds, the compensation received, or the demands of
the director's own affairs, a director in Pennsylvania must always
use the care a prudent man uses in his own affairs."
Where directors, as is the case in some large and some close
corporations, are, in reality, independent, highly paid professional
managers, the "own affairs" standard is not completely objection-
able; but, this is not the universal situation. In the future should the
court find occasion to apply the statute literally and should it reach
a result different from the common law, corporations will be forced
into employing experienced, professional directors at adequate com-
pensation. Without compensation or a personal interest in the
corporation's success, it is unlikely that one would be willing to
take on the responsibility of a directorship in a corporation of any
complexity.
ALBERT VICTOR WRAY
Corporations-Interested Directors-Fiduciary Duty and the
Business Judgment Rule
The business judgment rule is a defense to directors who, in the
exercise of their discretionary powers, cause corporate losses through
errors in judgment.' It is based on the assumption that the directors,
elected by the shareholders for this purpose, are in the best position
to decide corporate policy and that a court, less familiar with the
problems involved, should not substitute its judgment for that of the
directors.' The shareholders have no right to appeal to the courts
" For a criticism of the Pennsylvania statute as too subjective, see
Adkins 819. The comments to the NEw YoRK BUSINESS CORaORATioN LAW
§ 717 expressly recognizes the need for a flexible, comparative standard
of care: "The adoption of the standard prescribed by this section will allow
the court to envisage the directors' duty of care as a relative concept, de-
pending on the kind of corporation involved, the particular circumstances
and the corporate role of the director."
'See Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132 (1891); Otis & Co. v. Pennsyl-
vania R.R., 61 F. Supp. 905 (E.D.Pa. 1945), af'd per curiam 155 F.2d
522 (3d Cir. 1946); Spiegel v. Beacon Participations, Inc., 297 Mass. 398,
8 N.E.2d 895 (1937) ; Abrams v. Allen, 297 N.Y. 52, 74 N.E.2d 305 (1947).2 See Coffman v. Maryland Publishing Co., 167 Md. 275, 173 Ati. 248
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